Priming effects of cooperation vs. individualism were investigated on changeover speed within a 4  100-m relay race. Ten teams of four adult beginner athletes ran two relays, a pretest race and an experimental race 3 weeks later. Just before the experimental race, athletes were primed with either cooperation or individualism through a scrambled-sentence task. Comparing to the pretest performance, cooperation priming improved baton speed in the exchange zone (+30 cm/s). Individualism priming did not impair changeover performance. The boundary conditions of priming effects applied to collective and interdependent tasks are discussed within the implicit coordination framework.
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Behavioral priming research usually involves individual tasks or measures individual behavior within a collective task (e.g., Smeesters, Warlop, Van Avermaet, Corneille, & Yzerbyt, 2003; Utz, Ouwerkerk, & Van Lange, 2004) . For instance, Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Trötschel (2001) studied whether cooperation priming influenced participants' choices in a resource dilemma game. Primed participants replenished a common resource more readily than nonprimed ones. In other words, they were more cooperative after priming. Kay and Ross (2003) showed that participants intended to cooperate on a prisoner dilemma game more in the cooperation priming condition than in the competition priming condition.
Cooperation refers to positive social interdependence. People in a cooperative setting have mutual goals, resources to combine with others to attain the goal, and specific roles, and they get joint rewards. One's own success is positively related to the others' success. Competition refers to a negative social interdependence. People have opposite goals or can attain their goal only if the others fail to reach it. One's success is correlated with others' failure. Individualism corresponds to social independence between people for goals, resources, and rewards. People can attain their goal regardless of whether the others do or do not reach their goals (Stanne, Johnson, & Johnson, 1999) . These concepts have been used to define collective tasks or situations, but they have not been investigated as potential primes for collective tasks per se. Our first aim is to demonstrate that such social concepts (cooperation vs. individualism) can influence collective performance in a complex interdependent motor task.
Priming Effects on a Collective Task
Most studies concerned with cooperation, competition, or individualism priming effects (e.g., Bargh et al., 2001; Smeesters et al., 2003) investigated participants' choices in dyadic dilemma games. Could priming influence how people adjust their behavior to their partner's behavior? Cooperation, competition, or individualism priming influenced the way people monitored their own behavior and led them to adopt a cooperative or competitive or individualistic behavior. In other words, participants primed with cooperation were more likely to pursue collective goals rather than personal goals. However, cooperation priming might not influence whether people are able to adapt their behavior to the others' behavior. More than pursuing common goals, some collective performance requires that people adjust their activity to the others' activity. Cooperation, competition, and individualism could influence a collective performance requiring coordination.
Coordination can be done through explicit means, such as overt communication, planning, scheduling, and feedback, or through implicit means. Implicit coordination relies, on the one hand, on the development of expectations and predictions of the task's demands and other team members' actions and needs without being directly notified of these actions and needs, and, on the other hand, on dynamic actions taken to adapt behavior accordingly (Rico, Sanchez-Manzanares, Gil, & Gibson, 2008) . These assumptions and actions are unspoken (Espinosa, Lerch, & Kraut, 2004) . Authors suggest that implicit coordination can be automatic and unconscious; that is, team members may be unaware of the coordination (Espinosa et al., 2004, p. 10; Rico et al., 2008, p. 166) . Because priming effects generally occur outside of awareness, we suggest that priming could influence such implicit coordination.
Team sports provide countless situations that involve highly interdependent tasks requiring coordination (Reimer, Park, & Hinsz, 2006) .We focus here on 4  100-m relay race as a typical interdependent task. Each runner completes 100 m, holding a baton that must be passed to the next runner within a 20-m changeover box. The hard part of relays lies in the baton changeover. This sequence (changeover) is a complex and interdependent task that consists of running as fast as possible but in synchrony with a partner who is beginning their own sprint.
Lack of synchrony and coordination impairs speed and risks the baton falling and the team being eliminated. The baton changeover is a typical cooperative task since one's goal, reward, and resources are dependent on others' goal, reward, and resources. Athletes' training focuses mainly on the changeovers. Well-trained runners within a team could win against faster but less trained runners. For example, both the U.S. men's and women's 4  100-m relay teams failed to qualify for the Beijing 2008 Olympic final after dropping the baton in their heat.
The changeover in relay races requires implicit coordination that could be influenced by priming. Changeovers are a cooperative task embedded in a global context of individualism and competition. Cooperation priming could thus increase the changeover performance. Conversely, individualism and competition are concepts that could be detrimental to the changeover performance. As we wrote it earlier, individualism is related to independence between people whereas the changeover performance is a situation in which people are heavily interdependent. As such, individualism might impair implicit coordination by decreasing the changeover performance. The expected effect of competition on a 4  100-m relay is less clear because priming competition could boost the changeover performance if runners are competing against another team. However, if competition priming influences the behavior of team members toward each other, it could be detrimental. In this study, we decided to focus on the effect of priming cooperation or individualism on changeovers because both involve an intragroup situation and predictions are more straightforward. Individualism priming should impair the changeover performance whereas cooperation priming should increase the performance.
The Applicability Constraint on Priming Effects
The main moderator of priming effects is applicability (DeCoster & Claypool, 2004) , defined as the congruence between the features of a target concept (i.e., the prime) and the features of the behavior to be performed (Higgins, 1996) .The more congruent they are, the more likely the concept will be used (i.e., activated) to perform the behavior. With regards to target concept applicability, Higgins and Brendl (1995) distinguish several types of behavior: unambiguous, ambiguous, vague, and contrary. Behaviors are unambiguous when only the target concept is applicable, ambiguous when at least two concepts are equally applicable, vague when no specific concept is strongly applicable, and contrary when the behavior is more strongly related to an alternative concept than to the target one. Higgins and Brendl (1995) showed that a highly accessible construct influences a stimulus judgment even when the stimulus is vague or ambiguous. However, even a highly accessible construct cannot influence judgment of a contrary stimulus. Based on these findings, they proposed that "strong accessibility can compensate for weak applicability" [except] "when the applicability of a competing alternative construct is both strong and stronger than the target construct's applicability" (Higgins & Brendl, 1995, pp. 235, 238) . This constraint on the applicability of accessibility effects has remained overlooked in the literature, although it has received some interest in applied research fields (Althaus & Kim, 2006; Todorov, 2000) .
The changeover is unambiguously related to cooperation. Cooperation should thus influence performance. The behavior required during the changeover is contrary to individualism because it is more strongly related to cooperation. Individualism is thus inapplicable to the changeover and the applicability constraint should apply. If the applicability constraint holds, the expected impairment of changeover performance after individualism priming should not occur. We think that individualism will impair changeover performance because it is embedded within the sprint phases. Sprints are individual tasks to which individualism is applicable. Demonstrations of the applicability constraint were made on simple tasks only, to which the prime was either applicable or inapplicable (Higgins & Brendl, 1995) . Here, we will test the influence of a prime (i.e., individualism or cooperation) with different levels of applicability on a subtask that requires coordination (i.e., changeover), which is embedded within other subtasks (i.e., sprint). 1 Finally, we pursue two aims. First we want to test the effect of priming on a complex cooperative task that requires implicit coordination. Our second aim is to test the applicability constraint of priming effects on a subtask embedded within other subtasks, to which the prime is differentially applicable. We hypothesized that priming the concept of cooperation will improve changeover performance whereas the concept of individualism should impair it.
Method Participants and Design
Forty men (M age = 21, range = 20-25) participated in the experiment during academic training sessions. They were either first-year students in sports sciences and physical education or amateur athletes. They had never practiced the 4  100-m relay before the training session. Teams were randomly allocated to one condition of a 2 (priming: individualism vs. cooperation)  2 (race: pretest vs. experimental) mixed design with repeated measures on the last factor.
Priming Material
The constructs of cooperation or individualism were activated through a scrambled-sentence task right before the experimental race (Srull & Wyer, 1979) . This method has been widely used in priming research (Bargh et al., 1996; Kay & Ross, 2003; Kühnen & Hannover, 2000; Spears, Gordjin, Dijksterhuis, & Stapel, 2004 ). In the version we used, participants were presented with 16 scrambled sentences. Their task was to unscramble each sentence and to circle the intruder word. Within the series of 16, 12 sentences referred to the primed concept-either individualism (e.g., I do what I feel like doing) or cooperation (e.g., Finding strength in numbers)-and four filler sentences were neutral (e.g., I drink apple juice). The task can be seen in the appendix of this article.
Dependent Variable
We were interested in the collective performance during changeovers and not by individual performances. Participants had 20 m to safely complete the changeover, as fast and as accurately as possible. As such, we measured the speed of the baton within the 20-m changeover boxes, in meters per second (N = 30 for each race). This measure is thus a combination of the ongoing runner speed, the outgoing runner speed, and the quality of baton exchange. The baton speed is representative of the ability of the couple of runners to maintain (or improve) their own speed within the exchange zone and the time needed to exchange the baton while coordinating their actions. Races were videotaped with a numeric camera equipped with a time code. Changeover boxes and acceleration markers were indicated on the track with traffic cones so that they were visible to runners and on camera.
Procedure
The experimenters explained to participants that during the training session they would run two 4  100-m relays at a 3-week interval, and that their average performance would be used to evaluate them either for their gym grade or for selection for an upcoming competition (although this was not the case). Participants were randomly allotted to a rank and a team that were the same between the two races. Both races were performed at the same hour, on the same track, with similar weather conditions. The first race constituted our pretest measure. Participants were not primed during the pretest race. This measure constituted a reference speed without priming and allowed to control for interindividual differences. Three weeks later, participants ran the experimental race after being primed. The second experimenter, in charge of the priming task, explained they would participate in a study about concentration effects on performance. Each team was randomly assigned to a priming condition. The priming task was presented as a concentration task that made all runners' concentration levels uniform for the race. Participants all agreed to participate in the study. Each team was gathered in the lockerroom to complete the priming task and then immediately went to the track to run the race. Participants were not allowed to discuss the priming task or the race itself to prevent explicit coordination before the race. All teams ran alone on the track to avoid inducing competition. After the experimental race, participants were probed for any suspicions, and were thanked and fully debriefed.
Results
First, we controlled that teams were initially equivalent outside priming. The baton speed within changeover boxes during the pretest race did not differ between conditions, t(28) < 1.
Second, we submitted speed to a mixed-ANOVA. 2 The race had a significant effect, F(1, 28) = 12.33, p < .001,  2 p = .31. The baton was carried through the changeover boxes faster during the experimental race (M = 7.31, SD = .26) than the pretest race (M = 7.15, SD = .28). This is a typical effect of learning. The interaction of race by priming was also significant, F(1, 28) = 11.05, p < .001,  2 p = .28. This interaction indicates that there is more than a mere learning effect. In the individualism priming condition, there was no difference between the experimental speed (M = 7.14, SD = .21) and the pretest speed (M = 7.14, SD = .25), F < 1. It appears that neither a learning effect nor individualism priming influenced the speed during the experimental race. However, consistent with our hypotheses, in the cooperation priming condition, the experimental speed (M = 7.47, SD = .19) was faster than the pretest speed (M = 7.17, SD = .31), F(1, 28) = 23.37, p < .001. In other words, cooperation priming (and maybe a learning effect) allowed an increase in speed of 30 cm/s between the pretest and the experimental races. The experimental speed in the cooperation priming condition was significantly faster than in the individualism priming condition, F(1, 29) = 24.84, p < .001.
Discussion
Numerous studies have shown that cooperation or individualism priming can influence social behavior, leading people to make more cooperative or individualistic choices (i.e., Bargh et al., 2001; Smeesters et al., 2003) . However, few, if any, studies have investigated whether priming could enhance a collective performance, beyond individual performance in an interdependent task. We argued that priming could influence not only individual choices, but also implicit coordination, mutual adjustment, and synchrony. We did not directly test whether priming was able to modify implicit coordination. As a first step, we measured performance on an interdependent task that requires high motor coordination between two partners. We showed that indeed cooperation priming had beneficial effects on this collective performance. Future research should explore what factors involved in the performance were specifically influenced by priming (e.g., at the individual level: task expertise, attention, fatigue, current conscious goal, personality; at the interindividual level: implicit coordination, shared mental models, team cohesion, familiarity with the partner). One possibility is that priming cooperation enhanced the probability that the ongoing and outgoing runners shared the same situation model at the same time. Sharing the same situation model is indeed a necessary component of implicit coordination within teams (Rico et al., 2008) . Further research is needed to investigate how priming increased the baton speed within changeover boxes. We cannot conclude whether priming facilitates individual motor performance, anticipation of other people's movements, dynamic adjustment, working memory capacity, or other factors. However, this experiment is the first, to our knowledge, to show that cooperation priming can influence the whole performance beyond individual choices or performance.
One can also consider that improvements were relatively small (30 cm/s). However, the effect of cooperation on speed allowed the group in the cooperation condition to save 0.34 s over a whole relay (i.e., 60 m of changeovers). It should be remembered there were only 0.06 s between the British team, gold medal winner, and the Brazilian team (last finalist) during the 2004 Olympic Games. Such improvements after priming could thus "make the difference" if they could be extended from beginners in a training session to high levels of expertise and performance during competition.
Our second hypothesis concerned the applicability constraint on priming. We suggested that the applicability constraint would not hold when there are multiple subtasks to which the prime is differentially applicable. Higgins and Brendl's applicability rule (1995) predicted that primed individualism would not influence changeover because another concept (i.e., cooperation), although not primed, is more related to the behavior. Contrary to our expectations but consistent with Higgins and Brendl (1995), we found no impairment of performance after individualism priming, although we obtained a significant improvement after the applicable cooperation concept was primed. The applicability constraint is thus well supported in such a complex and interdependent task.
One limitation of the study concerns the difference between runners within teams. They ran different sequences (one or two changeovers) and in different orders (sprint or changeover first). The applicability constraint could be moderated by the order of applicable and inapplicable tasks. Our sample was too small to control for the rank effect, and future research should address this point. Higgins and Brendl (1995) noted that the applicability constraint is adaptive. The present findings go further and demonstrate in a natural field setting that the applicability constraint prevents potential negative effects of priming but preserves its positive effects on a highly interdependent task in which partners have to adapt their behavior to the action of others.
Notes
1. The applicability argument and expected priming effects could be extended to sprint performance (i.e., increase of sprint performance after individualism priming). However, effects at an individual level were not our focus of interest in this study. There is a plethora of research on individual priming effects in the literature compared with priming effects on interdependent tasks.
2. We ran the same analysis controlling for sprint speed of the ongoing runner as a covariate (either the control race speed or the experimental race speed or both). In all three analyses, sprint speed is not a significant predictor of changeover speed. The prime  race interaction remains significant in the three analyses. When controlling for the pretest sprint speed, the race effect was not significant, F(1, 27) = 1.2, p = .28. The sprint speed  race interaction was not significant, F(1, 27) < 1, p = .43. The interaction priming  race was significant, F(1, 27) = 11.53, p < .01. When controlling for the experimental sprint speed, the race effect was not significant, F(1, 27) < 1, p = .43. The sprint speed  race interaction was not significant, F(1, 27) < 1, p = .62. The interaction priming  race was significant, F(1, 27) = 10.88, p < .01. When controlling for both pretest and experimental sprints, the race effect was not significant, F (1, 26) < 1, p = .49. The pretest sprint speed  race interaction was not significant, F(1, 27) = 1.39, p = .25. The experimental sprint speed  race interaction was not significant, F(1, 27) = 1.02, p = .32.The interaction priming  race was significant, F(1, 27) = 11.91, p < .01.
